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Mar. 7, 1952.J

TIm PEOPIJE, Respondent, v. AURELIO MARTINEZ,

Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Murder-First Degree-Deliberation and Premeditation.-A homieide is murder of the first degree when the
ilCCUSl'tl, as the result of deliberation and premeditation, intended to take unlawfully the life of another. (Pen. Code,
§ 189.)
[2] ld. - Evidence - Deliberation and Premeditation. - Evidence
supports conviction of first degree murder of defendant's
wife on theory that murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated where defendant had long had difficulties with his
wife, announced that some day he would "do something bad"
to her, threatened and cut her with a deadly weapon on the
night before the homicide, remained home from work on the
day of the killing brooding over his troubles, and then, on
discovering that she had filed a complaint against him, picked
up Rn empty can, filled it with gasoline, proceeded directly
to her housE', pursued her despite her frantic efforts to eseapc, covered her with gasoline, struck a second match after
the first failed to ignite and set her on fire, failed to aid
in rescue attempts, Rnd hindered those attempts by disconnecting the hose.
[3) ld.-Murder-First Degree-Killing by Torture.-Murder is
perpetrated by means of torture when the assailant's intent
is to cause cruel suffering on the part of the object of the
attack, either for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or to satisfy some other untoward propensity.
[4] Id.-Evidence-Killing by Torture.-Evidence supports conviction of first degree murder of defendant's wife on theory
that murder was perpetrated by means of torture where defendant had previously stated that he intended to "do something bad" to his wife, and where the jury could reasonably
('onclude that, when he set about to burn her with gasoline,
his intention was to inflict cruel suffering as punishment or
rl'YC'nge on his victim.
[11 Sl'e Ca1.Jur., Homicide, § 14; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 14.
[21 HI'\! Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 13; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 15.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 15(2); [2] Homicide,
~ LiS; [3] Homicide, § 15; [4] Homicide, § 157; [5] Criminal
Law. ~.'J61; [6J Criminal Law, §554j [7] Criminal Law, §329j
[8] Criminal Law, § 264.

)
Mar.l!)32]

PEOPLE

v.

MARTINEZ

557

138 C.2d 556: 241 P.2d 2241

[5a,5b] Criminal Law-Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Examination of Experts.--Tt. is pl'O}Wf not to allow defendnnt's couns!'1
to alSk nn expert witrlt"ss for the prosecution in a homicide
cnse whether a person with a 2.35 alcohol content could "function not'lllally," where the question is directed only to the effect of inbxication, and where a negative answer, favorable
to the nccuiied, would not be directed to the specific issue before the jury whether defendant had the capacity to form the
specific intent essential to first degree murder; the question
should be rephrased so as to ask the witness whether a man
with such alcoholic content could understand the actions he
contemplated would culminate in the wrongful death of another human being.
[6) Id.-Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Opinions of Experts.-An
exp('rt may be asked a question which coincides with the ultimate issue in the case.
[7] Id.-Conduct of Judge.-Since a trial court has the duty to
illlStruct the jury on questions of law at the end of the case,
it can call counsel's attention to a rule of law in the presence
of the jury, when the rule is not being followed.
[8] Id.-Course and Conduct of 'l'rial.-The object of a trial is to
ascertain the facts and apply thereto the appropriate rules
of law in order that justice within the law shall be truly
admini8tered; it is not only the right but the duty of a trial
judge so to supervise and regulate the course of a trial that
the truth shall be revealed insofar as it may be, within the
established rules of evidence.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County,
and from an order denying a new trial. Frederick E. Stone,
Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing death penalty affirmed.
Robert H. Haden, Public Defender, and Ben Curry, Jr.,
for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Dan Kaufmann, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J .-Defendant Aurelio Martinez was charged
by information with the murder of his wife, Hope Martinez.
lIe pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
[6J Testimony of expert witness as to ultimate fact, note, 78
A.L.R. 755. See, also, Am.Jur., Evidence, § 782.
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A jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder of the ,first
degree without recommendation and found that defendant
was sane at the time of commission of the offense. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied and he was
sentenced to death. The appeal to this court is automatic.
(Pen. Code, § 1239.)
Defendant was 37 years old at the time of the homicide.
He and his wife Hope had seven children. During the marriage
he had many quarrels with Hope, and with her mother and
stepfather with whom they resided in Tulare. Defendant
threatened Hope, cursed her, and, on at least one occasion,
beat her. On May 2, 1951, after a long argument with
Hope and her mother, defendant moved out of the house.
His mother-in-law had him arrested about this time but the
judge released him after warning him to stay away from
the house where Hope lived.
Thereafter, until the time of the killing, defendant lived
alone in a house owned by his brother. He gave Hope about
$40 a week from his earnings to support herself and the
children and kept about $20 for himself. Hope made a luneh
for him each day to take to work and did his laundry. About
two weeks before the homicide defendant told a friend that
some day "he was going to do something bad" to her.
On August 2, 1951, defendant and Hope quarreled again.
He had come home from work and had no eigarettes or
money. He asked Hope, who was on her way to the grocery
store, to buy him a package of cigarettes. She refused, saying that she needed the money for milk for the baby and
for doctor's bills. Defendant felt aggrieved that out of the
$40 he had given her that week she refused to give him 15
cents for cigarettes. In the ensuing argument Hope said
that she would no longer make defendant's lunch. A woman
at the store said that "now somebody is going to see who is
going to be the boss." It irritated defendant that three
or four of defendant's friends overheard this remark. He
cursed his wife and left. Later that day he borrowed money
from a friend and bought a fifth of a gallon of wine. He
returned to his room and drank the wine. He arose during
the night, obtained a butcher knife and went to Hope's
house with the intention, he testified, of "scaring" her. When
he entered her bedroom, she screamed and aroused the house.
In the excitement her hand was cut by the knife and defendant ran out of the house.
The next morning defendant walked over to Hope's house
i
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and found that she had not left any lunch for him on the
porch. He told the driver of the car who stopped by to
take him to work, that he was staying home that day because
he had" a little family trouble." He idled about town during the morning. He telephoned Hope, but she told him
that she did not ,vant bim to bother her and hung up. Def£'ndant drank two or three bottles of beer and bought a fifth
of a gallon of wine. He returned to his room, lay in bed,
and drank nearly all the wine.
Later in the day defendant's niece and another young girl
looked in the bedroom window at defendant. He became
enraged and rushed out to argue with the girls' parents.
During this argument defendant was informed that the
police were looking for him, since Hope had signed a complaint against him because of the knife incident. Defendant
subsequently told an investigator that at that moment he
made up his mind to "destroy" Hope.
Defendant left his room for the Montellano Store, a few
blocks away. En route he picked up an empty lard can.
When he approached the store he saw his sister-in-law Molly
enter and followed her into the store. It was Molly's intention to call Hope to warn her to avoid defendant. Upon
discovering that he was following her, she became frightened
and IE-ft without calling Hope. After Molly left, defendant
also left and went to the Morales Grocery Store. At the
pump in front of the store he purchased enough gasoline
to fill the lard can. He then walked over to Hope's house,
carrying the can of gasoline, a small box of matches, and
a stick.
When he entered the back door, his sister-in-law Jessie
was calling the police because she had heard that defendant
was coming for Hope. The occupants of the house were thrown
into a panic. Hope ran out the front door as he came running through the kitchen. He followed her through the
house, knocking Jessie down and spilling gasoline on a young
girl who was in his ,yay. He shouted in Spanish, "Hope,
don't run, because any way I am going to destroy you."
As Hope ran through the yard she stumbled over some corrugated metal and fell. Defendant was beside her in a
moment and threw the gasoline over her. A woman neighbor who had come to the scene on hearing Hope's screams
shouted twice, "Don't burn her up." Defendant ignored
her. He struck one match, which failed to ignite. He lit
a second match and threw it on Hope's gasoline-drenched

J
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She caught on fire and at the sanie time the gasoline
remaiuing in the can ignited,apd defendant's clothes caught
on fire. The neighbor who had attempted to stop defendant
was slightly burned.
A witness who had been attracted by Hope's screams and
was watching the scene in horror snatched a blanket from
his (·ar. and threw it over Hope as she arose and started
to rlln in flames. With the aid of other witnesses, the flames
W('l'\' extinguished with the blanket and dirt. Meanwhile, another passerby dragged a hose from a nearby house towards
Hope. Defendant ran to the faucet, disconnected the hose,
Ilnd got under the faucet to put out the fire on his own
dothes. He made no effort to give Hope assistance. When
the police arrived, Hope's relatives w~re beating defendant
with sticks.
Hope was rushed to a hospital. Between 70 and 80 per cent
of her body was covered with second and third degree burns.
She died three days later. The doctor in attendance testified that the burns were the direct cause of her death.
)[any witnesses testified to these events. Defendant testified in his own behalf and agreed in all material matters
with the witnesses for the prosecution. When questioned
on cross-examination concerning his state of mind preceding the slaying, defendant stated that when he purchased
the gasoline, "·Well, I guess I just went up to see if I could
burn myself and burn her too. But I don't know just-my
mind was-I was just out of my mind." During his testi1ll()1I~' deff'ndant recalled all the events during the pursuit
of his victim, the throwing Qf the gasoline, the striking
uf the two matches, and the burning of Hope and himself.
lIis ability to remember details is significant in view of the
contention that he was too drunk to premeditate the killing.
The first question presented is whether the evidence is
sufficient to support a conviction of murder in the first degrf'f'. The instructions authorized the jury to return a
yerdict of first d<>gree murder on one or both of two theories: the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated,
or it was perp!'trated by means of torture. 1 There is substantial eyidcnee to support both theories.
[1] A homicidc is murder of the first degree when the
accused, as the result of deliberation and premeditation, inPenal Code, section 189, provides: "All murder whieh is perpetrated
IIII'nn9 of . . . torture . . . or by any other kind of willful. deliberate. and premeditated killing ••• is nlUrder of the first degree."
1
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tended to take unlawfully the life of another. (Pen. Code,
§ 189; People v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164, 178 [163 P.2d 8].)
[2] There is ample evidence of deliberation and premeditation here. Defendant had long had difficulties with his
wife. He announced that some day he would "do something bad" to her. On the night before the homicide he
threntenrd her with a deadly weapon. On the day of the
killing he remained home from work brooding over his
troubles. His acts following his discovery that his wife
had signed a complaint against him show a fixed intent
to kill her. His picking up the empty can, maneuvering
to prevent his sister-in-law from warning his wife, filling
the can with gasoline, proceeding directly to his victim's
house, pursuing her despite her frantic efforts to escape,
covering her with gasoline, striking a second match after
the first failed to ignite, and his failing to aid in rescue attempts and actively hindering those attempts by disconnect·
ing the hose, were all acts of deliberation that the jury could
reasonably conclude were done pursuant to a premeditated
plan to kill his wife.
.
[3, 4] The evidence also supports the theory that the mur·
del' was perpetrated by means of torture. Murder is so perpetrated when "the assailant's intent was to cause cruel
suffering on the part of the object of the attack, either for
the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or to satisfy
some other untoward propensity." (People v. Tubby, 34
Ca1.2d 72, 77 [207 P.2d 51]; People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d
1G4. 177 [163 P.2d 8],) In the present case defendant had
previously stated that he intended to "do something bad"
to his wife. The jury could reasonably conclude that when
defendant set about to burn his wife with gasoline, his intention was to inflic~ cruel suffering as punishment or reo
vrnge on his victim.
. The principal contention presented by defendant concerns
the trial court's rulings on questions asked by defendant on
cross-examina tion.
After the defendant was taken to the hospital for treat·
ment of his bnrns, a blood sample was taken by the doctor
in attendance. Dr. Eckleson, and given a laboratory analysis.
The analysis showed that at about 8 p. m., when the sample
was taken, the nlcohol content of defendant's blood was about
1.9 milligrallls per cubic centimeter. Dr. Neal, director of
a laboratory in Visalia, who regularly examined intoxicated
persons for the shrriff's offil't' nnd the Cnlifornia Highway
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Patrol, testified that the average alcohol destruction in a
person is approximately 10 per cent per hour, which would
make the alcohol content in defendant's blood at the time of
the killing, about 6 :30 p. m., approximately 2.3 or 2.35 milligrams per cubic centimeter.
Dr. Eckleson, called as a witness for the defendant, thought
that the average person was "drunk" with about 1.5 alcohol
content in his blood. On cross-examination he stated that
the influence of alcohol on mental and physical faculties differed greatly from one person to another. When asked by
the prosecution to apply his theories to the facts of this case,
Dr. Eckleson replied that he thought that a person with
the alcohol in his blood that defendant had would be able
to buy gasoline, pursue another person and drench her with
the gasoline, and light the gasoline, but would still be so
drunk that he wouldn't "know what he was doing."
In rebuttal the prosecution called Dr. Neal, who had not
personally examined defendant or the blood specimen. He
testified that a person with 1.9 alcohol content would understand the consequences of his actions and, on cross-examination, that a person with 2.35 alcohol content could tell right
from wrong.
Counsel for defendant asked Dr. Nealon cross-examination
if the mind of a person with a 2.35 alcohol content could
"function normally." The court, in the presence of the
jury, discussed the problem at some length and refused to
allow the question to be asked. 2 After the jury was excused,
·"Haden [counsel for defendant]: And at 2.3 or 2.35, Doctor, his
mental ability would be considerably impaired, I take it!
"Dr. Neal: His mental ability would be further impaired, but it is
my opinion that his judgment would not be so impaired that he could
not tell right from wrong.
"Haden: That isn't the proposition here, Doctor. This isn't a matter of sanity. This is a matter of whether or not his mind could function normally. Do you feel his mind could function normally'
"The Court: That isn't the question. That is misstating the proposition. The question is whether his mind would be so affected by the
alcohol that he couldn't form the intent to commit the act. If the-the jury will have to determine whether or not because of the alcohol
he is alleged to have consumed he would be incapable to form the in·
tent to commit torture. That is one thing. And also whether he would
be able to premeditate, to commit the murder with premeditation. And
the question is not whether he was sane or insane, not whether his mind
functioned properly, but whether his mind under those conditions was
lIuch that he could form the intent to commit either of those two acts.
"Haden: Your Honor, I wonder if you would ask that the jury be
excused, please."
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the issue was argued by counsel. The court again refused
to allow the question and stated that the inquiry must be
directed to defendant's ability to form an intent to commit
torture or murder. Counsel for defendant did not show any
inclination to pursue the issue of sanity and refused to follow the line of questioning indicated by the court. The witness was excused.
[50.] The court's ruling presents the question whether counsel should have been allowed to ask if defendant's mind
"functioned normally." In PeopZe v. WeUs, 33 Cal.2d 330,
350 [202 P.2d 53], a majority of this court stated: "It thus
appears that on the trial in its first stage, mental capacity
to commit the crime, insofar as sanity, but sanity only, is
concerned, is conclusively presumed but that the specifie
mental state (intent or motive) necessary to be proved as
a fact in order to establish guilt of the particular crime is
not presumed, either conclusively or otherwise. Whenever
a particular mental state, such as a specific intent, is by
statute made an essential element of a crime, that specific
state must be proved like any other fact." (Accord, PeopZe
v. Letourneau, 34 Cal.2d 478, 487 [211 P.2d 865]; People
v. Danielly, 33 Cal.2d 362, 379 [202 P.2d 18].) It is contended that under the views expressed in the foregoing cases
the court's ruling was erroneous. We have reviewed this
contention with. care because given defendant's admission
that he committed the homicide, his only defense of any substance is that he did not have the capacity, by reason of
intoxication or otherwise, to form the intent necessary for
first degree murder. The disallowed question was not directed to this defense. Dr. Neal testified as an expert on
the effect of alcohol on a person's mental and physical capacities. The question whether a person with a 2.35 alcohol
content could "function normally" was directed only to the
effect of intoxication in the obvious hope that the witness'
would answer in the negative. But a negative answer, favorable to the accused, would not be directed to the issues of
the trial. The question before the jury was whether defendant had the capacity to form the specific intent essential
to first degree murder. A person with the alcohol in his
blood defendant had, will not ordinarily "function normally" but it does not follow that he could not commit
first degree murder. As defense counsel undoubtedly realized,
the jury would not necessarily take this distinction into consideration. . Faced with a h9stile witness, counsel under-
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f;tandably wished to protect his client's interests by asking
his f[UI'stions in a gel1l'ral rather than a specific manner.
Thp \·i(·(' of tIlt' ql1('stion is that it was designed to elucidate all answer that could be misinterpreted by the jury.
This case is not one in which the trial court foreclosed
inquiry into the mental condition of the defendant. The
court at all times expressed willingness to allow counsel to
pursue the matter further if he would rephrase his question.
Under these circumstances its refusal to allow the question
as presented by counsel was not error.
Defendant points out that in ruling that the question
must be rephrased, the court limited the inquiry to defendant's capacity to form the specific intent essential to
first degree murder. He then contends that the suggested
line of approach was improper, on the theory that an expert witness could not express an opinion on the state of def('ndant's mind. [6] Defendant's argument is based on the
erroneous assumption that an .expert cannot be asked a question that coincides with the ultimate issue in the case. (People v. Wilson, 25 Ca1.2d 341, 349 [153 P.2d 720] ; State v.
Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 184 [185 P.2d 757] ; 7 Wigmore, Evidence [3d I'd.], § 1921; see cases collected in 78 A.L.R. 755;
20 Am.Jur., 653.) [5b] Counsel could properly have asked
Dr. Neal whether a man whose blood had a 2.35 alcohol content could understand that the actions he contemplated would
culminate in the wrongful death of another human being.
Defendant also attacks the ruling of the trial court on
the ground that the discussion in the presence of the jury
was prejudicial. .At the request of defendant's counsel the
jury was instructed to disregard the statements of the court,
and he assured the court that the admonition cured any error.
[7] In any event, since a trial court has the duty to instruct
the jury on questions of law at the end of the case, it can
call counsel's attention to a rule of law in the presence of
the jury, when the rule is not being followed. (People v.
Vukich, 201 Cal. 290, 298 [257 P. 46].) [8] "The object of a
trial is to ascertain the facts and apply thereto the appropriate rules of law, in order that justice within the law shall
be truly administered. It is not only the right but the duty
of a trial judge to so supervise and regulate the course of a
trial that the truth shall be revealed in so far as it may be,
within the established rules of evidence." (People v. Mendez,
193 Cal. 39, 46 [223 P. 65] ; People v. Ottey, 5 Ca1.2d 714,
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721 [56 P.2d 193J; 3 Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed.], § 784.}
The .indgment and the order denying the motion for a
IH'W trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J.,
and Spence, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 5250. In Bank. Mar. 11, 1952.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JULIO T. APARICIO,
Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity.-

The sanity' contemplated by Pen. Code, § 1368, relating to
the determination of the sanity of defendant when doubt
thereof arises prior to judgment, is tested by appraising
defendant's present ability so to understand the nature and
purpose of the proceedings taken against him as to be able
to conduct his own defense in a rational manner.
[2] Id.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Doubt of
Sanity as Basis for Trial.-A strong sho,ving is required before an abuse of discretion is deemed to result from the trial
court's failure to order a determination of present sanity;
the "doubt" as to defendant's sanity, requiring a trial of such
issue under Pen. Code, § 1368, is one that must arise in the
mind of the trial judge, rather than in the mind of defendant's counselor in that of any third person.
[3] Id.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Doubt of
Sanity as Basis for TriaI.-Testimony of experts as to insanity in a general sense is not sufficient to create a doubt
as to defendant's sanity, requiring a trial of such issue
under Pen. Code, § 1368, insofar as that testimony does not
relate to defendant's ability to condu~t his own defense.
[4] Id.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Discretion of
Court.-When a doubt of dcfendant's sanity at the time of
trial as contemplated by Pen. Code, § 1368, appears on the
face of t.he record as a matter of law, an abuse of discretion
[1] Test of present insanity which will prevent trial for crime
or punishlllcnt after conviction, note, 3 A.L.R. 94. See, also, Cal
Jur., Criminal Law, § 270.
McK. Dig. References: [11 Criminal Law, § 236(1); [2,3] Criminal Law, § 236(2) j [4,6] Criminal Law, § 236(5); [5J Criminal
Law, §236.
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